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Abstract: While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophers 
often take population size as given. This paper is an attempt to formulate a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian approach 
to population size: does it make sense to speak of ‘too few’ or ‘too many’ people from the point of view of 
justice? It argues that, drawing on key features of liberal egalitarian theory, several clear constraints on 
demographic developments –to the extent that they are under our control – can be formulated. Based on these 
claims, we both clarify both the grounds and content of our obligations to future generations.   
 





Does justice require that we attempt to change demographic developments in a certain 
direction? Suppose that justice requires an emphasis on preventive medicine, the promotion 
of gender equality, and relatively open borders. Implementing these proposals (or any 
alternative) will influence how many people there are by affecting longevity, fertility and 
migration respectively. And, although affecting population size is not the goal of these 
policies (the goal is to act on the demands of justice); change in population size is an 
important effect.  
Yet, there are several reasons to think that population size itself should be a matter of 
concern. According to the UNFPA (2012) medium estimate, world population  is projected to 
grow from well over 7 billion today (in 2016) to over 10 billion in 2100. One may worry that 
with this many people, it will be difficult (if not impossible) to provide all with enough 
resources to lead good (enough) lives sustainably. Barry (2005, 256-257), for example, 
argues first, that issues of poverty and global inequality are harder to solve if there are more 
people to be lifted out of poverty; and second that a larger world population makes it harder 
to lower the total amount of emissions. Ceteris paribus, the more people the larger the 
environmental impact1. Could there be too many people? The reverse claim, that there are too 
few people is less often made. But the number of people can become so low that a society (or 
humanity) threatens to go extinct. Massive depopulation may have severe consequences for 
                                                        
1 The number of people is not the only variable that matters for the total impact of humanity 
on the environment. Levels of consumption, availability of green technology, etc. play 
important roles as well.  Nothing I say hear should be read as implying that these other 
variables do not matter.  
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those who live it through (see e.g. Gheaus 2015). These are both worries about the absolute 
size of a population.  
Not only the absolute size of a population can be a worry. Steep drops in fertility levels 
combined with increased longevity (like in Japan, Germany or Italy) means that the 
percentage of old age dependents grows. A small number of economically active ‘young’ are 
to provide (financially, in terms of care, etc.) for a relatively large group of dependent old. 
This puts pressure on welfare states, e.g. for funding healthcare, old age benefits and 
pensions.2 Some fear an elderly bias in democratic decision-making through the ‘grey vote’.3 
Reversely, very high fertility comes with large numbers of young dependents, requiring 
considerable investment in terms of education, healthcare and care, which may put pressure 
on society and the economy.4 In either case, one may worry about the relative size of 
successive generations, and that there are too many or too few (new) people. 
This paper does not claim that all these worries are actually justified. The question is whether 
such worries about ‘too few’ and ‘too many’ make sense to begin with from the point of view 
of justice?  
                                                        
2 These developments give rise to question of justice between age groups and generations. 
See Daniels (1984) or McKerlie (2013). Both take demographic change as given 
developments that have to be dealt with in a fair way.  
3 For different analysis see Goerres and Vanhuysse (2012);Van Parijs (1998) for several 
policy proposals.  
4 The rapid economic development of countries like South Korea is sometimes explained in 
terms of rapid declines in fertility levels, which allowed for high per capita investment in the 
next generation. See May (2012, 49-52 ). 
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The literature on justice between generations and sustainability has grown considerably over 
the last decades, but the question of the right number of people has received far less attention 
in the justice literature.5 Population is often taken either as a given (exogenous) or constant6. 
Demographic change is not completely ignored. Some point to the demo-sensitivity 
(Gosseries 2009, 138; Gaspart and Gosseries 2007, 205) of the Rawlsian savings principle 
that describes our obligations to future generations. If we have an obligation of justice to 
establish or maintain just institutions, and if the amount of resources required to act on this 
duty fluctuates with the size of the population, it follows that the size of the population 
determines the size of intergenerational transfers. Population, on such a view, is not a 
variable we should change, but relevant information for determining how much should be 
transferred to future generations. It does not, at first sight, offer guidance on which 
demographic developments should be pursued.  
 
                                                        
5 There are some exceptions, like Heyward (2013); Heyd (1994); Casal (1997); Miller (2005). 
The question how rank different population sizes in terms of goodness is left to population 
ethics, the link with justice is seldom made. See e.g. Parfit, (1984, part IV); Broome (2004); 
Arrhenius (forthcoming). Another notable debate is that in parental justice, which is 
concerned with who should pay for children once they exist. See Casal and Williams (1997) 
or Olsaretti (2013).    
6 Philosophers assuming population size as given or constant often acknowledge that this is 
problematic, e.g. Simon Caney (2013, 299n), acknowledges that his discussion is incomplete 
without a further discussion of the population question.   
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Yet the question which demographic developments we should pursue makes sense: they have 
a significant impact on how well peoples’ lives go.7 This may be a necessary condition for 
considerations of justice to apply, but it is not sufficient. Natural disasters also affect peoples’ 
lives, but non-human caused disasters are neither just nor unjust. 8 Rather the way we respond 
to them is a question of justice. Demographic change is not always like this. Taking 
population as constant or given is (in many cases) either a simplification or a mistake. 
Considering closed societies, procreation is especially important here: new people do not 
arrive, to paraphrase Rakowski (1991, 170), by storks, but are the results of the aggregation 
of actions and decisions on the individual and policy level.9 The size of future generations 
depends to a large extent on the procreative decisions we take now.10  
                                                        
7 This is certainly true for people that are currently alive, but the non-identity problem 
renders such claims problematic for future generations (Parfit 1984, ch.16).  Her I claim that 
population impacts the kinds of lives people have (now as well as in the future). This is not a 
comparative claim.  
8 Due to anthropogenic Climate Change many of the things called ‘natural disasters’ are at 
least partially caused by human actions. Here I have non-human created disasters in mind. 
9 This is not always true, e.g. in the developing world where having many children is often 
not a freely taken decisions. See (author ref).  
10 If we do not assume a ‘closed society’, migration is another factor, except when talking 
about the population of the planet). To avoid important topic, I will briefly mention migration 
but mostly focus on what is demanded in a closed society, like Rawls (1993, 11). For 
cosmopolitan egalitarians, given that from/to the world there is no migration, this is 
unproblematic.  
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But pointing to the fact that we can influence demographic developments is not enough to 
show that we should. This paper moves population size to center stage. They key question is 
whether liberal egalitarian theories of justice impose requirements on population size, by 
drawing (mostly) on John Rawls’ work. By presenting the sparse remarks he made on this 
issue in a systematic way, I ask whether theories of justice can make sense of intuitions about 
‘too many’ or ‘too few’ people. Should we take demographic change as a given, or should we 
attempt to change them in a certain direction?  I defend the latter position. This exercise helps 
us to clarify and specify obligations of intergenerational justice. Although some of the 
remarks may be of exegetical interest, the goal of this paper is to formulate the most 
plausible, philosophically strongest, Rawlsian approach to demographic justice. Whether we 
should endorse all the elements of this view is another question, but it is important that we 
look at what Rawls’ views entail in this domain.  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I ask whether population size is subject to the demands 
of justice, and argue on the grounds of national responsibility in this context that it is (2). I 
then argue two negative points: that there is no  ‘optimum population’ from the point of view 
of justice (3); and that a plausible view cannot be based aggregative principles (4). Section 
(5) defends a minimal threshold, whereas section (6) argues for a higher threshold: stable just 
institutions. Section (7) concludes with a discussion of constraints on population policies, 
their relation to the principles of justice and the just saving principle, and some possible 
objections.   
 
2. Responsibility for Population Size 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls explicitly takes position on questions of population size:  
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An important role of people’s government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries 
may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and the 
effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its 
environmental integrity, as well as for the size of the population. As I see it the point 
of the institution of private property is that, unless a definite agent is given 
responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for not doing so, that asset 
tends to deteriorate. In this case the asset is the peoples territory, and its capacity to 
support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people themselves as politically 
organized (Rawls 1999, 38-39). 
There are two ways to understand the claim that the government is responsible for the size of 
the population. First, it could be responsibility understood as moral responsibility. In this 
sense, ‘X is responsible for Y’ means that X would be morally blameworthy if she fails to 
comply with Y. A claim of this kind is that ‘this employer is blameworthy for engaging in 
racial discrimination in hiring.’ 
The second sense of ‘responsibility’ is outcome responsibility: ‘X is responsible for decisions 
Y’ means that X is the person who should bear the consequences (positive or negative) of her 
decision Y (e.g. Miller 2007, ch 4; Lippert-Rasmussen 2009, 112-113). This is responsibility 
in about what we have to do – or not – for others. An example of such a claim would be ‘if 
John loses a large part of his fair share of resources in the casino, John is the person who 
bears this loss: others do not owe him compensation for the bad (option) luck he suffered’. 
This is not necessarily a moral evaluation of the action itself (gambling may be an 
unproblematic activity), but only tells us who can expect what from whom. It is crucial to 
keep these two types of responsibility separate, because the liability for demographic change 
and the moral responsibility to steer it in a certain direction may not always fall on the same 
agent, as we will see. 
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Although, as I will point out below (sections 5 & 6), the government can also have moral 
obligations, like Rawls (in his reference to bearing the loss) I focus on responsibility as 
outcome responsibility. Rawls resistance to open borders as an answer to population pressure 
in this light can be clarified. He says that: 
[p]eople must recognize that they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in 
caring for their land and its natural resources by conquest in war or by migrating 
into other people’s territory’s without their consent (Rawls 1999, 107). 
In other words, if a country ends up with a larger population than it can or wants to support, it 
cannot expect others to solve the problem for them, for example by opening their borders.  
This argument can be supported by appeal to an argument Rawls gives elsewhere. Imagine 
two countries. I will use David Miller’s (2007, 70-72) names for these countries. At time T1 
they are equally prosperous. Due to cultural differences both countries go through different 
demographic developments. One reaches a stable population (Condominium), whereas the 
other country’s (Procreatia) population continues to grow. Some decades later Condominium 
is much richer than Procreatia although both are internally just (Rawls, 1999, 107). 
Cosmopolitan distributive principles would call for distribution. Rawls finds this implausible 
because peoples’ are ‘free and responsible, and able to make their own decisions’.11  
Requiring migration or distribution, Miller argues, “seems to undermine national self-
determination by nullifying its inevitable effects”. The idea of national responsibility means 
that “we are responsible for what we collectively decide to do, and we should bear the 
outcome, for better or worse” (Miller 2011, 15).  
                                                        
11 Many cosmopolitan egalitarians, myself included, will fail to see the force of this counter-
example and accept that redistribution is required, which may be an easy bullet to bite (e.g. 
Holtug 2011, 158).  
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Limiting national responsibility, Miller argues, limits national self-determination. This leads 
to the question why national self-determination matters. This is too big a question to answer 
here, but the appeal to national responsibility here may be quite uncontroversial. Many liberal 
egalitarians doubt that responsibility can be meaningfully ascribed to collectivities, because it 
seems to be in tension with moral individualism (e.g. Tan 2004, 73).12 Although collective 
responsibility may arise in some contexts, in cases involving the intergenerational transfer of 
responsibility this is at least problematic. Holding people responsible for their ancestors’ 
actions even though they did not even exist at the time the decision was taken, is 
incompatible with moral individualism.  
By distinguishing between the instrumental and intrinsic justifications for national 
responsibility, we can render Rawls’ claim more palatable for more cosmopolitan minded 
egalitarians. The justification appealed to here is instrumental in nature.  
Seemingly echoing the argument of The Tragedy of The Commons (Hardin 1968), Rawls 
argues that if nobody is responsible for the state of the environment, the land will deteriorate. 
If we assign responsibility to a government, it will take better care of the land as the 
representative of its’ people: the success of their own intergenerational collective project is at 
stake.13 Similarly, Barry argues that: ‘the existing regime of closed borders creates pressure 
on governments to introduce policies to control population growth. This pressure would be 
                                                        
12 E.g. Tan argues that ‘citizens of disadvantaged countries are collectively held accountable 
for their country’s unsound policies, even when a majority of them had no part in the making 
of these policies and that this is clearly inconsistent with Rawls’ own moral individualism’ 
(2004, 73).  
13 This assumes that current generations care about their offspring or about the national 
project. If this is false, the instrumental justification for national responsibility does not hold.  
 10 
weakened if faster population growth in a country could be offset by faster emigration’ 
(Barry 1992, 282).  In other words, open borders or cosmopolitan egalitarian principles limit 
national responsibility by taking away both the capacity to and the motivation for states (and 
those they represent) to act in a sustainable way.14  
This instrumental justification for inequalities is not incompatible with many egalitarian 
cosmopolitan views: individual citizens of a society are not morally blameworthy for, or that 
they were in control of, the state’s policies. Responsibility acts as an incentive, like higher 
monetary rewards in some professions. On a Rawlsian view inequalities are justified not 
because they are deserved, but as far as they are to the maximum advantage of the well-off 
(e.g. Van Parijs 2003). Responsibility plays a similar role here: people are held responsible 
for the decisions of their government for efficiency reasons: the alternative would be worse 
for everyone (e.g. Holtug 2011, 157).  
One may object that this argument is too hasty. Suppose that the incentive fails in a particular 
case, and a state fails to control population, resulting in poverty several generations later. 
Should the descendants be held responsible and are they, hence, without any claim to 
support? Not necessarily. First, some are rather optimistic about the possibility of solving 
problems arising from population pressure.15 But a case for support can be made as well: this 
                                                        
14 Much more needs to be said about migration and sustainability. Barry (1992), Miller 
(2005) and Rawls (1999) reject the idea of open borders (partially) because it undermines 
national responsibility, which undermines incentives for sustainable choices.     
15 Following Sen (1999, ch. 8-9) Rawls argues that: ‘Respecting human rights could also 
relieve population pressure within a burdened society, relative to what the economy of the 
society can decently sustain. A decisive factor here appears to be the status of women. Some 
societies – China is a familiar example – have imposed harsh restrictions on the size of 
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countries should be treated as historically burdened societies, to which liberal peoples have a 
duty of assistance. This duty requires that setting up just institutions becomes possible, e.g. 
through through international transfers or by supporting the evolution of the political culture 
(Rawls 1999, ch. 15).  
What does this discussion of national responsibility tell us about population size? It tells us 
little about how many people there should be. But it shows there is such a requirement. The 
need for national responsibility as an incentive shows that some demographic developments 
are better (or worse) from the point of view of justice than others. Second, it tells us that a 
population principle will leave room for national discretion with regard to population size 
(see section 3).  
On the basis of this discussion, we can formulate a principle of national responsibility for 
population size. This principle applies insofar as it is true that there are good instrumental 
reasons to allow for national self-determination: 
Claim 1. Responsibility Principle: The responsibility for population size lies with 
the national government, and they are to carry the  consequences (positive and 
negative) that result from demographic change.  
This principle plays the role of a secondary principle. As with individual decisions on the 
national level, within the range of permissible options people carry the consequences for the 
choices they make. You are free to do with your primary goods as you see fit, but you are 
responsible for the consequences. This does not tell us what falls within the range options 
                                                                                                                                                                            
families and have adopted others draconic measures. But there is no need to be so harsh. The 
simplest most effect, most acceptable policy is to establish the elements of equal justice for 
women’ (Rawls 1999, 109-110). 
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compatible with justice. The same is true for demographic developments: we have identified 
the agent who carries the responsibility for the decisions taken among the range of 
permissible actions, but not which courses of action are permissible. For this, we need to look 
elsewhere.  
 
3. No Optimum 
Some welfare economists use the notion of an optimum population. A population is optimal 
for a given territory if and only if no possibly population for that territory does better terms of 
certain criteria: e.g. GDP or utility. There may different populations that preform equally 
well. One could think that there could be an optimum population from the point of view of 
justice. Is this what the incentives discussed in the previous section should aim for? Rawls’ 
disagrees:  
I do not use the term ‘overpopulation’ here since it seems to imply the idea of 
optimal population; but what is that? When seen as relative to what the 
economy can sustain, whether there is population pressure is a clear enough 
question (Rawls 1999, 116).  
There are two key ideas in this passage. First, Rawls seems to suggest that there is no such 
thing as an optimum population, no value in reference to which a population can perform 
best. Rawls is consistent in his rejection of this idea. In a letter to Phelps he writes:  
I am somewhat doubtful that the view I suggest can be applied to population 
growth, that is, to determine optimum population size; I hadn't meant it to apply 
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to this but rather to savings, taking population size as more or less given, and 
possibly increasing, or whatever.16 
There are two possible explanations for Rawls’ rejection of the idea of an optimum. Roemer 
offers the first possible reason:   
The question of what is the best population size for the world is not, strictly 
speaking, one of distributive justice, for given any population size, there should 
exist a just distribution of resources. If the distribution is just in each of two 
worlds with different population sizes, I do not think we can further say that one 
world is more just than the other (Roemer 1996, 153). 
Roemer’s claim is that whatever the size of a population is, principles should point to a fair 
distribution of resources among those with legitimate claims. Although the division of goods 
may have an effect on how many people there are (through effects on natality, longevity and 
migration) the claim cannot be that it is better because the population is bigger/smaller. No 
meaningful comparison can be made. Suppose two alternative worlds, world A where there 
are many people with very high levels of wellbeing and world B where there are only a few 
people with very low levels of wellbeing. Both are internally just. On what grounds can we 
claim that one world is more just than the other? Roemer’s doubt seems legitimate. It would 
be odd to claim that a just society is more just by virtue of it being more populous.  But 
although the size of the population right now is given, future population size is not. Even in a 
closed society one can influence population size over time. Rejecting the optimum does not 
imply the acceptance of complete laissez-faire.  
                                                        
16 John Rawls in a 1974 unpublished letter to Edmund Phelps (02/07/1974). Harvard Rawls 
Archives, Hum 48 Box 13 Folder 8. I thank M. Rawls and T. Scanlon for their permission to 
use this quote.   
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The second reason one may want to reject the notion of an optimum population is an appeal 
to liberal principles. Rawls’ tale of two countries is relevant again. Both provide ‘equal 
justice for women’ but the latter one ‘happens to stress these elements’ (Rawls 1999: 117) 
while the former does not because of ‘its prevailing religious and social values freely held by 
its women’. As a result, one country has high population growth and the other not, and the 
latter ends up twice as wealthy. Rawls points out that a global egalitarian principle would 
require redistribution, the duty of assistance does not because ‘both societies are liberal […] 
and their peoples free and responsible, and make their own decisions’ (Rawls 1999: 117).  
This passage aims to show the counterintuitive results of cosmopolitan views, but what is 
important for our discussion is that one development is not seen as better or worse by 
Rawls17. Condominium cannot be more just than Procreatia if both have internally just 
institutions. They simply have different cultures and priorities. Requiring Procreatia to act as 
Condominium would violate liberal neutrality. Some peoples value economic development 
over procreation, whereas others may place a greater value on large families than on 
economic growth. The second reason, then, to reject the notion of an optimum population is 
that requiring a specific demographic development would significantly limit peoples’ self-
determination, which is instrumental in allowing different peoples’ to pursue their respective 
collective plans among which liberal theories are neutral.    
From this discussion, we can infer the following claim 
                                                        
17 One may doubt that Procreatia can actually be internally just given the position of its’ 
women. Would women really freely accept position in which they flourish less in the 
economic and political world? This is an important worry, but let us assume for the sake of 
the argument, that this could be the case.  
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Claim 2. No Optimum: Egalitarian justice does not require the demographic 
developments that optimizes a particular value; and liberal considerations exclude 
settling on one particular optimum (or set of optima).  
In the passage at the start of this section Rawls seems to reject the idea of ‘overpopulation’, 
because he thinks this implies the existence of an optimum. Overpopulation on such a 
possible definition means too many people in reference to an optimum. We could use it more 
loosely to refer to the idea that there are too many people - implied by Rawls’ use of the term 
‘population pressure’. This is the second key idea of the passage cited. The rejection of an 
optimum does not imply the rejection of the possibility of there being too many people, as 
Rawls suggests:  
About intergenerational maximin, I guess I don’t think it is feasible, but each 
nation could follow maximin within its borders and adjust its population to its 
natural resources and endowments, taking into account gains from trade, etc. Of 
course, all that’s rather utopian but it seems to work out alright.18 
                                                        
18 Rawls, unpublished letter to Phelps (02/07/1974). Harvard Rawls Archives, Hum 48 Box 
13 Folder 8. In a similar passage he writes:  
 
 For one thing, I have considerable unease in applying the conception of justice 
to the problem of population size. I discussed this question only in connection 
with the contrast between classical and average utilitarianism, and not in 
connection with the two principles of justice. (I would like to think that they 
give a better conclusion than either form of the utility principle; but I am afraid 
that so much more enters in that the answer is still uncomfortably artificial. Yet 
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Although the difference principle takes population as a given, there may be reasons (which 
will be worked out below) to adjust population over time.  The conclusion of this section is 
negative: there is no optimum population from the point of view of justice. But the rejection 
of an optimum does not mean the rejection of all limits or all reasons for adjustments – there 
can be too many people. The rest of the paper will focus on the identification of such limits.   
 
4. Rejection of Aggregation   
In A Theory of Justice Rawls points to the tendency of total utilitarianism to demand an 
increase in population size, similar to Parfit’s repugnant conclusion (Parfit 1984, ch. 16):  
The classical principle requires that so far as institutions affect the size of 
families, the age of marriage, and the like they should be arranged so that the 
maximum of total utility is achieved. This entails that so long as the average 
utility per person falls slowly enough when the number of individuals increases, 
the population should be encouraged to grow indefinitely no matter how low the 
average has fallen. In this case the sum of utilities added by the greater number 
of persons is sufficiently great to make up for the decline in the share per capita. 
As a matter of justice and not of preference, a very low average of wellbeing 
may be required (Rawls 1971, 162). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the whole question is so difficult that perhaps even a simple scheme is of some 
help. Though one wouldn’t want to rely on it alone). 
 
John Rawls in a letter to Partha Dasgupta (26/06/1972), Harvard Rawls Archives, Hum 48 
Box 18 Folder 7. I thank M. Rawls and T. Scanlon for their permission to cite these passages.   
 17 
The claim is that in cases where population is a variable (rather than constant) the demands of 
(impersonal) total and average utilitarianism diverge. Total utilitarianism demands an 
increase of the number of people up to the point where adding another individual would 
detract more utility than it would add. In Parfit’s words: ‘the greatest mass of milk might be 
found in a heap of bottles each containing only a simple drop’ (1984, 388).  The contracting 
parties in the original position would reject such a principle, because ‘it would appear more 
rational to agree to some sort of floor to hold up average welfare’ (Rawls 1971, 163).  
 
Claim 3. No aggregative principles: the principle regulating demographic change 
cannot be based on aggregate principles that disregard the distribution of wellbeing 
in the population.    
This claim is linked with the discussion above: total utilitarianism is rejected because it puts 
everything and everyone in the service of the optimum. Whatever it is that justice requires 
with regard to population size, it cannot endorse an increase of the population in order to 
maximize the aggregate welfare. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with the 
Rawlsian framework. This claim does not tell us what population size to should strive for, but 
it offers a negative constraint. A principle that recommends increasing the population to the 
point where people would lead lives barely worth living, or one that allows the suffering of 
some to be offset by the flourishing of others, would be unacceptable.19 It is on this latter 
                                                        
19 Many doubt whether Rawls’ argument involving different number cases behind the veil is 
coherent (e.g. Barry 1977). I think there are ways to construct the original position that avoid 
the absurdities Barry (and many others) argue follow from having the contracting parties 
decide on different number cases – for example by emphasizing the condition of universality 
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ground that average utilitarianism should be rejected.  Like total utilitarianism, it does not 
offer a real minimum floor. It allows for a trade-off between different people - it does not 
take seriously the ‘distinction between persons’ (Rawls 1971, 27). It treats everyone in 
function of reaching the highest average. This is why average utilitarianism is rejected in 
favor of justice as fairness (Rawls 1971, ch. 29), which is especially concerned with those 
who have the least. What kind of floor does this view imply?  
 
5. Minimal Threshold 
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice presuppose a minimal threshold, and Rawls hints at a 
link between population and this threshold: 
Crucial is also the country’s population policy: it must take care that it does 
not overburden its land and economy with a larger population than it can 
sustain (Rawls 1999, 107).  
This is an explicit reference to limiting population size in order to make sure the population 
can be ‘sustained’. But what does it mean for a population to be sustainable? The first 
element Rawls refers to, is that it should not ‘overburden the land’ and, in the letter to Phelps, 
that it should ‘adjust [the] population to its natural resources endowments’. This resembles 
what ecologists call carrying capacity, defined as ‘the maximal population size of a given 
species that an area can support without reducing its ability to support the same species in the 
future’ (Daily and Ehrlich 1992, 762). Thinking about population in these terms makes sense 
given the open-endedness of societies: ‘political society is always regarded as a scheme of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
explored in Attas (2009, 202-204) or Reiman’s (2007) proposal that the particulars of future 
people do not matter.  
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cooperation over time indefinitely’ (Rawls 1993, p. 463) which ‘produces and reproduces 
itself and its institutions and culture over generations and there is no time at which it is 
expected to wind up its affairs’ (Rawls 1993, 18).  
At what level should individuals, at the minimum, be supported? Rawls defends a basic needs 
threshold lexically prior even to the first principle of justice (Rawls 1993, 7; Casal 2007, 323-
325; Gardiner 2011, 133). This threshold protects the necessary conditions to make effective 
use of the liberties (protected by the first principle).20  At the very minimum, we should 
understand ‘to sustain a human population’ to refer to basic needs, which includes food, 
shelter, some education and the like.  
This claim implies that demographic developments that undermine the capacity of the natural 
world to provide for future people up to this threshold is unacceptable, setting an upper limit 
to the absolute size of the population. Moving from conditions of moderate scarcity to a 
situation of extreme scarcity leads to collapse at best and violent conflict at worst.  
Natural carrying capacity is not fixed. The number of people that can sustainably live on a 
territory depends on how they interact with it. A population with a resource intensive way of 
life, without ways to mitigate their impact and without sustainable technology, will reach the 
limits of the carrying capacity with a smaller size, than a population which use less  resources 
and have developed green technology. The world can support more tree-planting-vegetarians-
on-bikes than golf-playing-carnivores-in-SUV’s. The way we treat the environment also 
                                                        
20 This draws on Casal: ‘Few deny that the elimination of certain types of deprivation, such as 
hunger, disease, and ignorance, are very weighty political requirements. Many accept 
Rawls’s view that a just society will guarantee a social minimum and may even agree that 
any reasonable conception of justice will favor “measures ensuring for all citizens adequate 
all –purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms”’ (2007, 299).  
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affects the carrying capacity: e.g. depleting non-renewable resources, irreversible 
desertification, or deterioration of fresh water sources all have a negative impact carrying 
capacity.21 
Rawls does not only refer to natural carrying capacity, but to social carrying capacity as 
well: the demographic change which the economy and institutions can sustain. When 
population increases to the point where the natural environment can no longer support it, 
neither can the economy.22 Too few people may be possible as well, although it is perhaps 
less likely. Even very small communities may (in reasonable favorable conditions) be able to 
meet their members’ basic needs. But complex modern societies depend on high degrees of 
technology and specialization, which requires a rather large number of people.  
Demographic shifts, rapid depopulation (resulting in ageing) and rapid growth (resulting in 
many dependent young) creates pressure as well. In an extreme version of the former, there 
are not enough people to care (financially, medically and personally) for the dependent 
elderly. In an extreme case of the latter, the labor market might not be able to absorb the large 
amounts of new people, or per capita investment in education may fall (e.g. May 2012, ch. 5).  
It is thinkable that this may lead to a violation of a plausible minimal floor: 
                                                        
21 Ehrlich’s I-PAT formula is useful here: the total impact of humanity is a function the 
number of people (population), their affluence (resource consumption) and the level of 
technology (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971).  
22 An additional complication is that, although this may be true on a global scale, a country 
may also make up for its’ population growth through international trade. On the framework 
offered here it is unproblematic to depend on international trade for sustenance, as long as 
one can continue to do so in the future. 
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Claim 4: Minimal Floor. Demographic developments should fall within the range of 
options compatible with a) the capacity of the environment or the economy to support 
each individual to the basic needs level (subsistence constraint) and b) the capacity to 
meet this threshold indefinitely (open-endedness constraint).  
Does sustainability require that the number of people that can be sustained remains constant 
(i.e. that the carrying capacity goes unaffected)? Consider: 
The Wasteful generation. 10 million people inherited a rich world from their ancestors. 
They like a good party and spend everything they inherited on hedonistic pleasures like 
champagne and fireworks. They leave a world in which a population of 1 million 
people can live in a sustainable way. They regulate procreation in such a way the next 
generation (G2) to consist of 1 million people.  
Can we condemn the Wasteful Generations (intuitively bad) behavior? Although it limits the 
carrying capacity of the land, it also adjusts the population so that it can be sustained 
indefinitely. Does the minimum floor imply that the carrying capacity should be able to 
accommodate a population of the same size (i.e. a maintained carrying capacity)? Or is it 
enough to leave act so that future generations basic needs are met?  
There is no good reason to opt for the former understanding of sustainability. Liberal theories 
do not attach intrinsic value to there being more or less people. A world with more people 
living lives above the threshold is not necessarily better than one with less. What matters is 
that whoever lives, has their basic needs met. But, as I argue below, there are other reasons to 
condemn the wasteful generation’s decisions in most circumstances.  
 
6. Stable Just Institutions 
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Rawls argues that the principles of justice do not apply across generations and across nations 
(e.g. Gosseries 2014), but obligations to future people do not stop at the provision of basic 
needs. What we owe to future generations is expressed in terms of the just savings principle, 
which is a threshold conception like the duty of assistance. The just savings principle is a 
two-stage model. In the accumulation stage, savings (transferring more than received from 
previous generations) is required for the establishment of just institutions. Once these are 
firmly established, the duty to save no longer applies: 
Real savings is required only for reasons of justice; this is, to make possible the 
conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time 
(Rawls 2001, 159). 
The savings principle is taken to be demo-sensitive, taking fluctuations in population size 
(both of relative adjacent generations as the absolute numbers) into consideration. The 
amount intergenerational transfers required depends on the number of future people: 
Thus the savings rate as a constraint on current consumption is to be expressed 
in terms of aggregate capital accumulated, resources use forgone, and 
technology developed to conserve and regenerate the capacity of the natural 
world to sustain its human population (Rawls 1999, 197). 
The goal of the just savings principle is to support the capacity of the natural world to sustain 
its human population. Again, this is a reference to some sort of carrying capacity, but the 
threshold lies higher than in claim 4, aiming not just at the continued possibility of meeting 
basic needs, but at  the continued existence of just institutions. How much is needed for this  
depends on how many people there are in the future. This argument for demo-sensitivity can 
be summarized as follows: 
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1. We have a duty to create (accumulation phase) and uphold (steady state) 
just institutions; 
2. The transfers needed to establish/uphold just institutions fluctuates with the 
size of the population; 
3. Thus, the size of intergenerational transfers depends on the size of the 
(future) population.  
 But as Heyd and others (e.g. Dasgupta 1994, 100) point out, the relationship between savings 
and population is:  
deeper than hinted at by Rawls: it is not only that the (expected) numbers of future 
people should affect our savings policies as some sort of relevant background data; 
these numbers might very well be a crucial part of, or indeed the very subject of these 
policies. And as population trends have become something over which we – the 
present generation – have gained some control, we cannot avoid articulating 
normative principles for making those choices. (Heyd 1994, 42) 
Population – insofar as it affects establishment and maintenance of just institutions – should 
be taken seriously by those genuinely committed to the idea behind the savings principle. Of 
course, population is not the only variable that matters for the possibility of stable just 
institutions. Levels of consumption, the possibility of mitigation and the ability to use 
resources efficiently play an important role as well. A genuine commitment to sustainable 
just institutions requires a commitment to all the necessary preconditions for such 
institutions. Some demographic developments will, no matter how much we save, (generate 
an impermissible risk to) undermine just institutions. Each nation has an obligation from 
justice not to create a situation in which they are being held responsible for more than they 
can afford. If demographic changes undermine just institutions there are reasons from justice 
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to (try) and alter them. Drawing on this argument, we can make sense of Rawls’ reference to 
the reproductive labor: 
The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the 
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from 
one generation to another […] Thus, reproductive labor is socially necessary 
labor. […] The family must ensure the nurturing and development of such 
citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring society (Rawls 1993, 
467).  
Creating citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring society should be 
understood as a requirement that demographic developments are compatible with the 
(establishment of) stable just institutions over time. This implies a reformulation of the 
argument for demo-sensitivity. We change one premise and the conclusion changes as well: 
2b.  Using policy instruments, both the savings rate and the size of a population 
can be influenced. 
3*.  Thus, we must adjust either the savings rate or the (future) population size 
to create or uphold stable just institutions.   
 
This implies a 5th and final claim that liberal egalitarians will support:  
 
Claim 5. Stable Just Institutions: demographic developments should be such that it is 
compatible with the maintenance – or, in the accumulation stage, with the creation – of 
just institutions.  
Demographic change is, on this view, permissible if it does not undermine the possibility of 
establishing or sustaining just institutions. A necessary requirement for a demographic 
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change to be permissible is that by adapting intergenerational transfers, pressure on just 
institutions can be avoided. A demographic change that cannot be compensated for through 
savings (because would require an transfer that surpasses the capacity of the current 
generation to save) but can be prevented, would violate this rule. 
What does this view imply in terms of the four different worries about population size? With 
regard to the absolute size, both over- and under-population are real possibilities. Any 
demographic development that leads to the collapse of just institutions because of an increase 
in numbers would not be acceptable. This is not a far-fetched scenario, as several historical 
examples of collapse partially due to an increase in population show.23 Stable institutions can 
collapse, for similar reasons as mentioned above, under population pressure. At the lower 
level, there may be cases (again, perhaps especially in complex economies) where there is 
minimal number of people needed.24  
But not only the absolute size may matter here, relative size could matter too: a rapid growth 
may find an economy unprepared, and per capita investment in education and healthcare 
demanding. The reverse, rapid ageing may put a just society under pressure as well, if the 
burden on the young becomes high or insufficient investment in the dependent elderly can be 
made. If this is the case, the wasteful generation’s decisions above may very well be 
problematic: such rapid depopulation may threaten stable institutions. Controlled 
depopulation may be permissible. The specifics of scenarios and their probability need not 
concern us here. What matters is that these scenarios are thinkable and possible.  
                                                        
23 See for several examples Diamond (2005) 
24 Although, in a globalized world, this services and goods can of course imported to address 
the needs of small communities (say, islands in the pacific with small populations).  
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The threshold argued for here is substantially higher than the subsistence threshold. The 
difference can be explained by linking to the two stages of the savings principle: the 
accumulation phase and the steady state. The first minimal threshold applies to the possibility 
of just institutions: a demographic development that undermines basic needs, undermines the 
possibility of the creation of stable just institutions (it takes us out of the circumstances of 
justice). The second threshold applies once these institutions are established: they have to be 
continued into the future. This threshold is higher: a demographic development may 
contribute to the collapse of a just society without making its’ reestablishment impossible.25  
Roemer’s claim cited above, that optimum population is not a question of justice properly 
speaking, is correct. Rather, population size matters in so far as it affects the possibility of 
just institutions. This is a threshold view, and is indifferent between large inequalities 
between different generations that result from demographic change. One population is indeed 
not more (or less) just than the other, if both are internally just. If one population, on the 
other hand, has gone through a demographic development that made just institutions either 
collapse or impossible to begin with, there are good reasons to say that it is less just than the 
other.  
Rawls reference to the family as part of the basic structure and ‘reproductive labor as socially 
necessary labor’ is crucial. Although the government as the representative of the people may 
                                                        
25 Setting such a threshold blocks anything like the repugnant conclusion (Parfit 1984, ch. 
17). Any demographic compatible with just institutions is not, at least not for reasons of 
intergenerational justice, to be regretted. Because of its’ indifference to aggregation, the 




be liable for demographic developments in its’ borders, this does not mean that the moral 
obligation to realize or avoid certain demographic developments lies with the government 
alone.  The principles of justice apply to all institutions that make up the basic structure. 
There are many ways in which the state can and does influence demographic developments, 
but the range of acceptable policies is limited (see conclusion for some remarks on 
enforcement). The state cannot, morally speaking, in most circumstances strictly enforce 
reproductive rates. If the state was the only agent on which these demands had any force, one 
may conclude that to the extent that the state cannot change demographic change, we would 
have to treat demographic growth as given and try to accommodate it (e.g. Heyward 2011).  
However, if Rawls is right when he points out that the family’s role is to produce and 
reproduce ‘the right number of citizens’, the requirements of justice have force on the family 
as well. The state may be liable – it has to internalize, internationally speaking,26 the costs of 
demographic change (Heyward 2011, 103) – other agents may blameworthy (for some 
worries about this claim in non-ideal circumstances, see (author ref)) in case where 
demographic developments violate the discussed standards. The family, as part of the basic 
structure, has a (collectively held) duty to produce the ‘right number of citizens’ (see e.g. 
Gheaus 2015).  
Some argue that Rawls and Rawlsians are unable to deal with questions of sustainability in a 
satisfactory manner.27 The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The strategy pursued here to 
define the limits on acceptable demographic change in order to protect the necessary 
                                                        
26 What justice requires with regard to the costs of parenthood and procreation within state is 
another question, see Casal and Williams (1997) and Olsaretti (2013) for opposing views.  
27 Gardiner (2013), argues that different strategies that are open to Rawlsians, some pursued 
here, fail to pass his ‘global test’.  
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conditions for stable just institutions could be applied to other questions of sustainability as 
well.28 This argument should be understood as a part of a broader strategy to equip liberal 
egalitarianism to deal with issues of sustainable just institutions.  
 
7. Justice and Population  
Based on these five claims, we can answer two distinct questions about population and 
justice. First, we can say much more about what justice requires (morally speaking) with 
regards to demographic change, and on whom these requirements fall. We have four 
constraints on our decisions that affect demographic change, which elaborate and clarify the 
Rawlsian view of justice between generations. First, there is not one optimum in terms of a 
particular value, but a range of acceptable population sizes. Second, indefinite increase is 
impermissible. The positive requirements clarify the two-stage mode: the basic needs 
threshold and the just institutions threshold play their role within the accumulation phase and 
steady state respectively. In other words, insofar as demographic developments are under 
human control, they have to be such that they are compatible with the (establishment of) 
sustainable just institutions, and their environmental and economic basis.  
Second, we can say something about who should carry the consequences of (allowing) certain 
demographic developments to take place. Assuming national responsibility, this is the 
government as the representative of its people. There are, however, limits to this national 
responsibility. Insofar as past generations have failed to act on obligations of 
intergenerational justice, countries cannot be asked to shoulder the consequences, and should 
be treated as burdened societies, to which a duty of assistance is owed.  
                                                        
28 As Casal (2007, 325) points out as well: ‘Why Sufficiency is not Enough’. 
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These claims help to fill another important gap in Rawls’ account of intergenerational justice: 
an argument for the demo-sensitivity of intergenerational transfers. Demographic 
developments are something– to some extent – under our control. Combining this idea with 
the claim of responsibility (claim 1) allows us to justify why how much we ought to transfer 
to future generations depends on how large future generations are (instead of depending on 
how much we received from previous generations). If a future population is larger/smaller 
than the current population, current generations need to transfer enough for just institutions to 
survive this growth/decline in population, even if this requires substantial per capita savings. 
When should generations transfer more to future generations than they received from 
previous generations (Gosseries 2009, sec. 4)? Once we realize that demographic change is at 
least partially a consequence of decisions people and governments take, we could propose 
with Barry that:  
[t]he size of future population should be brought within the scope of the 
principle of responsibility. We must define intergenerational justice on the 
assumption that “the increase of mankind shall be under the guidance of 
judicious foresight”, as Mill put it. If future people choose to let population 
increase, or by default permit it to increase, that is to be at their own cost (Barry 
1997, 109). 
In so far as G1 is collectively responsible for demographic change, it is also their collective 
responsibility to make sure that they save as much as needed to maintain just institutions. 
This gives Rawlsians the tools to explain why sometimes generations need to transfer more to 
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future generations than they received, something most reciprocity-based views have 
difficulties explaining (Gosseries 2009).29  
The constraints proposed here work in tandem with the just savings principle. Once just 
institutions are established, both give substantial leeway for different plans (i.e. there is not 
one particular aim) but they set limits on what can be done. Like the savings principle, it 
restricts the application of the difference principle. Increasing the population in order to 
benefit the presently least well-off at the cost of doing the generation’s ‘fair share of the 
burden of realizing and preserving a just society’ (Rawls 1971: 289) is impermissible, both in 
the accumulation stage (when aiming to meet the demands of claim 3) and in the steady stage 
(acting on claim 4).30  
                                                        
29 Responsibility for keeping future people above the threshold runs into the non-identity 
problem. Several promising strategies - like Kumar’s (2009) or Roser and Meyer’s (2009) - 
to defend a person-affecting view of intergenerational obligations are compatible with the 
just savings principle. Alternatively, one could think justice institutions have impersonal 
value (e.g. Heyd 2009). The success of the approach Rawlsian approaches set forth here 
depends on one of these strategies succeeding.  If not, this is not a problem specific to 
Rawlsian theories but one for all closely related views.  
30 In the steady stage a generations does its fair share when it transfers sustainable institutions 
(i.e. responding to or adjusting demographic change) to the next generation. In the 
accumulation face (earlier generations, or generations after a period non-compliance) doing a 
fair share of saving is more demanding: accumulate for the sake of future generations living 
under just institutions. For a possible justification of why it is fair to burden already badly off 
generations, see Gaspart and Gosseries (2007: 197). For Rawls’ discussion of the limit placed 
by the savings principle on the difference principle, see: Rawls (1971, 292). 
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This does not mean that any population policy that is compatible with just institutions over 
time is permissible. There are other justice related reasons why imposing certain limits on 
procreative behavior is impermissible.31 One may argue that some demographic policies will 
violate bodily integrity or pose threats to gender equality. Arguing for limits on demographic 
change is sometimes mistaken for appraisal of coercive policies like the Chinese.32 By 
endorsing certain goal as desirable one does not endorse all possible means to reach them: 
some means are better than others (see e.g Sen 1999, 217-223), and sometimes the (moral) 
cost of enforcement may simply take priority over the (moral) cost of giving up the goal, 
because the available means violate the basic liberties protected under the first principle 
(which enjoys lexical priority). These questions of enforcement deserve further discussion, 
but I cannot do so here.  
Additionally, one may argue that people have a weighty interest in having the opportunity to 
procreate and parent, and that these options should not be taken away – even if this could be 
done in a morally permissible way – to make future people richer. These are additional 
plausible limitations on demographic policies that governments may pursue, but they are mot 
worries about population size, but concerns about justice among contemporaries: which 
sacrifices can be asked from whom, and how – if at all – can demographic policies be 
enforced? It may be wrong to coercively impose a certain demographic development, even 
though it does not lead to there being either too few or too many people.  
We have seen that duties of intergenerational justice take priority over the difference 
principle. But suppose that we have to choose between two possible demographic policies 
                                                        
31 See e.g. Heyward (2013, 719-725).   She argues that in such cases there is a collective 
obligation to (try) to accommodate population growth.  
32 See e.g.  (Author ref).  Rawls (1993, 110) explicitly rejects coercive population policies.  
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compatible with just institutions over time. Policy A would require increased savings, making 
the least well-off in society slightly less well-off than under the alternative policy B. Do we 
have an obligation of justice to go for the policy which maximizes the position of the least 
well-off? The same question arises for intergenerational savings: would it not be unfair to ask 
the least well-off to contribute to savings? Rawls answers that they do not take an ‘active part 
in the investment process’33 but they would support the arrangement needed for the duty of 
saving to be met. 
  
In the scenario under discussion this reply is not available: we stipulated that a certain 
demographic development is only compatible with intergenerational transfers diminishing the 
position of the least well-off. Given that their expectations ‘are to be maximized subject to 
the condition of putting aside the savings that would be acknowledged [by the parties in the 
original position]’,34 it follows that reasonably avoidable demographic developments which 
require savings that diminish the position of the least well-off are unjust, unless the they 
themselves agree to make a part of their fair share available to accommodate demographic 
growth.35 However, the veto of the least well-off in this case is valid if, and only if, 1) there 
are no other ways to pay for the maintenance of just institutions than taking from the share of 
those who have the least; and 2) averting a demographic development detrimental to the 
position of the currently least well-off can be done using acceptable means, i.e. it does not 
violate the basic liberties of contemporaries (due to their lexical priority). 
                                                        
33 Rawls (1971:292). 
34 Rawls (1971:292). 
35 Gaspart and Gosseries (2007) criticize the permissibility of intergenerational savings at the 
cost of the least well-off, and argue that savings are unjust if (and in so far as) these transfers 
could be used to benefit the least well-off.  
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This paper aimed to present a plausible reading of justice as fairness on population size. 
Should we accept it? Some aspects of the view presented are worrisome. It allows for 
significant inequalities between nations. Cosmopolitan egalitarians will find this problematic, 
at least insofar as there is no good instrumental justification for the inequalities. This does not 
mean they should reject the entire view described here. One may think that requirements that 
apply to each state should apply to the whole planet instead – and let go of claim no. 1.  
A fundamental worry about the Rawlsian principles of intergeneration is what we could call 
the permissiveness objection. This objection comes in two forms. In its sufficientarian form it 
runs as follows: even if the basic needs and just institutions threshold are met, this does not 
mean future generations have enough: wasteful generations would, on these principles, be 
allowed to leave future generations a world in which people do not have a reasonable 
standard of living.36  Whether this objection succeeds depends on where one places the 
threshold. Rawls thought that his view on intergenerational justice was not too permissive: 
[i]t is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high material 
standard of life. What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, 
these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just 
basic institutions. To achieve this state of things great wealth is not necessary. In fact, 
beyond some point it is more likely to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless 
distraction at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness (Rawls 1970, 270). 
In other words, Rawls suggests that the goods needed to formulate and pursue meaningful 
plans in life are available under just institutions. For the sufficiency objection to succeed, one 
would have to show that there are relevant interests that are not protected by just institutions. 
                                                        
36 I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.  
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For example, that if the minimum transfers are made it would be difficult for future 
generations to satisfy some of their most important plans in life. But from limited 
opportunities we cannot conclude an injustice. Rawls argues that people have ‘responsibility 
for their ends’, which entails that they have to form plans that they can reasonable hope to 
achieve with the goods we are entitled to.37 If the transfer is compatible with 
intergenerational justice, future generations will simply have to formulate plans within the 
constraints of the world the wasteful generation left them. For the objection to succeed, it is 
necessary to show that intergenerational justice requires more, e.g. a set of opportunities 
beyond the opportunities available under just institutions.  
One could also appeal to the egalitarian version of the permissiveness objection: it is unfair 
to grant wasteful generations permission to waste resources as long as just institutions are 
preserved, because this results in future generations having less opportunities and primary 
goods than previous generations. Intergenerational egalitarians38  – who defend the view that 
intergenerational justice requires equality (not sufficiency) – will object Rawls’ indifference 
to intergenerational inequalities above the threshold. If one holds this view, the disagreement 
runs deeper. New challenges arise for setting demographic goals: strict equality across 
generations limits the range of permissible options, because it sets a specific aim for 
intergenerational justice. It requires that present generations transfer a combination of 
population that allows for intergenerational equality. Such more precise requirements may 
                                                        
37 E.g. ‘It is supposed that they have adjusted their likes and dislikes, whatever they are, over 
the course of their lives to the income and wealth and station in life they could reasonably 
expect. ’ (Rawls 1993, 2) 
38 Most explicitly committed to equality across time are: Gaspart and Gosseries (2007).  
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several limit the options of the living, which may stand in tension with the liberal 
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